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I. INTRODUCTION
Have you ever felt like nobody?
Just a tiny spec of air.
When everyone's around you,
And you are just not there.'
Divorce, that once unspoken condition considered the breakup of a
family, now reflects a growing way of life for America's families. In 1998,
"19.4 million adults nationwide were divorced, representing nine point eight
percent of the population.",2 Florida is no exception to this phenomenon. In
Florida in 1990, over one million adults were registered as divorced, repre-
senting ten percent of the adult population. 3 Accompanying this increasing
divorce rate is an evolving generation of children growing up in single parent
households. According to the Current Population Survey, in 1970 only
twelve percent of children under eighteen years of age lived in single parent
households.4 This number grew to twenty three percent in 1980, to twenty
seven percent in 1990, and to thirty two percent in 1998 . Today, these
percentages equate to over twenty million American children under eighteen
years old living in one parent households.6 The changing face of America's
families and household situations creates new challenges not only for health
care professionals, school planners, and childcare providers, but also for
legislators and judicial officials. Specifically, legislators and judicial offi-
cials grapple with the problem of how to balance the feelings and desires of
the children affected by divorce with the interests of society for stable, clear
laws. Florida's courts and legislators expressly state that they place the
7
"best interests" of the children as the primary focus in divorce issues.
However, in reality, few actually consider the children's opinion when
establishing these best interests.
1. JACK CANFIELD ET AL., CHICKEN SOUP FOR THE KID'S SOUL 83 (1998) (quoting
nine year old Karen Crawford).
2. U.S. CENsuS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. PPL-100, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS (1998).
3. TERRY A. LUGAILA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) available at http://www.census
.gov/population/socdemo/ms-la/tabms-stl .txt.
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CENSUS BRIEF, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK, (1997).
5. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM BIRTH
TO SEVENTEEN: TE LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN, 1998 (1999).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Marshall v. Reams, 14 So. 95, 96 (Fla. 1893) (holding that the benefit
and welfare of the child is the "pole star" by which courts are guided).
[Vol. 25:815
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Divorce impacts a child's life in a major way. From the child's per-
spective, the finality associated with custody proceedings provokes strong
feelings of duress. As the opening poem of this article suggests,9 they
watch their world collapse around them while nobody takes the time to ask
their opinions. Custody decisions determine not only with whom the child
will live, but also geographically where the child will reside, and under what
conditions the child will be raised.10 Increasingly, "the laws of this nation
recognize that children have a legitimate interest in the important decisions
affecting their lives."" Most states today, either through statutory mandate
or through common law practice, acknowledge the benefit of listening to and
including as a determinative factor, the children's preferences in custody
decisions.1
2
Florida, among the least progressive states on this issue, 13 statutorily
includes a child's preference as one of a multiplicity of suggested factors for
courts to consider in custody determinations.14  As Part IV of this article
8. Randy Frances Kandel, Just Ask the Kid! Towards a Rule of Children's Choice
in Custody Determinations, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 299, 358 (1994).
9. CANFBD Er AL, supra note 1.
10. Wallace J. Mlyniac, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873 (1996). "Judges determine where children will live, with
whom they will live, how they will live, and what will be done to, by, or for them." Id.
11. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children's Preference in Adjudicated Custody Decisions,
22 GA. L. REv. 1035, 1039-40 (1988).
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2000). The statute states:
(3) For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best in-
terests of the child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and
interests of the child, including, but not limited to:
(a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the nonresidential parent.
(b) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the
parents and the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized
and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care,
and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory envi-
ronment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed cus-
todial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child;
3
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shows, the broad spectrum of interpretation given to this statute by Florida's
courts and judges has created a chaotic environment for divorce litigation.15
Is this chaos in the best interests of the children?
Many of Florida's cities and towns have developed plans to attract
younger residents. 16 These plans are working.17 The residents of Florida are
getting younger.'1 Younger residents desire modem approaches to their
legal problems. As this article will show, requiring courts to consider chil-
dren's preferences in custody determinations will move Florida back into a
leadership position, making the state more attractive to a younger popula-
tion. Part II of the article explores the national trend, specifically identifying
four categories of legal approaches taken by the fifty-one jurisdictions
around the nation. Part III describes Florida's current legislation; and Part
IV explores the multiplicity of interpretations Florida's courts have given to
this legislation. Part V rounds out the analysis by evaluating judges' re-
sponses to children's expressions of preference. Taken together, the article
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to
express a preference;
(j) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encour-
age a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the
child and the other parent;
(k) Evidence that any party has knowingly provided false information
to the court regarding a domestic violence proceeding pursuant to
s. 741.30;
(1) Evidence of domestic violence or child abuse;
(in) Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant.
Id.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. See, e.g., Sallie James, Shaping Their Images: Cities in Central and North
Broward are Trying to Strike Balances as They Deal with Growth, Development, and Gener-
ally Younger Demographics, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 1997, at 33 (discussing
changing demographics "as young families move into neighborhoods once limited to sen-
iors"); Madelaine Gonzalez, Posner's Proposal on Condos Stirs Fear: Hallandale is Hoping
To Lure Younger People, SUN-SENTlNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 22, 1996, at 1B (discussing
city commissioner's goal of attracting a younger population to Hallandale).
17. See Robert Sargent Jr., The Villages is Quietly Growing More Youthful; Despite
What You See in Ads, The Community is Home to More and More People Who Aren't Ready
for Retirement Yet, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIBUNE, Aug. 19, 1998, Lake Sentinel at I (noting
that "[m]ore and more residents 30 to 40 years olds are buying or inheriting homes"); see also
David K. Rogers, St. Petersburg Wears Younger Face, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 2, 1995,
at 3B (discussing the affects of the "influx of young families and vacationers of all ages");
Terry Sheridan, Deerfield Cove Area Attracting Younger Buyers, BROwARD DAILY Bus. REV.,
Sept. 24, 1997, at A2 (noting the trend since 1994 towards younger buyers).
18. Id.
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clearly justifies the assertion that Florida should adopt legislation mandating
consideration of children's preferences in child custody decisions.
II. THE NATIONAL TREND
The growing trend around the nation is acquiescence to children's
wishes in custody determinations.'9 Each year, an increasing number of
states adopt legislation requiring courts to consider children's preferences.
20
In 1977, there were sixteen states in which the affected children's preference
was manator21was a mandatoy consideration. This number grew to thirty-two jurisdic-
tions in 1998. Today, thirty-four jurisdictions statutorily mandate that
courts consider children's preferences in custody determinations.23 Amongthese thirty-four jurisdictions, twelve consider the child's preference as the
19. Kathleen Nemecheck, Note, Child Preference in Custody Decisions: Where We
Have Been, Where We Are Now, Where We Should Go, 83 IOWA L. REV. 437,445 (1998).
20. Id. at 443 (noting that states began to seriously consider statutory guarantees after
the passage of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in 1970).
21. Id. at 445. Among the sixteen states were: California, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, and Texas. Id. at 444 n.60, 61.
22. Id. at 445. These jurisdictions included: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
23. These states include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA. STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 2000); ARiz.
Rv. STAT. § 25-403(A)(2) (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(a) (West 2000); COLD. REv.
STAT. § 14-10-124 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §722
(2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(5)(A) (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(a)(3) (2000); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 571-46(3) (2000); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (Michie 2000); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/602(a)(2) (West 2000); IND. CODE § 31-14-13-2 (2000); IOWA CODE § 598.41(3)(f) (2000);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(B) (Banks-Baldwin
2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.19-A, § 1653 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 9-
103 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23(3)(i) (2000); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (2000); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
212(1)(B) (2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364 (2)(b) (2000); NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.480(4)(a)
(2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2000); N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 2000); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(i) (2000); 23 PA. CODE § 5303(a)(1) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-1515 (Law. Co-op. 2000); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.008 (Vernon 2000); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-6-106 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE §
26.09.187(3)(vi) (2000); Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (2000).
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key and controlling determining factor.24 Another twenty-two states statuto-
rily mandate courts consider the child's preference along with other factors
when making custody determinations. Of the seventeen remaining states,
seven have permissive statutes suggesting that courts consider a child's
preference in such determinations. Florida is among these seven states
with permissive legislation. 27 Only ten states make no mention of children's
preferences in custody determinations in their statutes.28 In most states in
these last two categories having no statutory mandate, however, courts are
still giving weight to the wishes of the children.29 The remainder of this
section will explore in more detail each of these described legislative groups.
24. These states include: California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. See
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042 (a) (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-9-1(a)(3) (2000); HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-46(3) (2000); MD. CODE ANN. FAm. LAW § 9-
103 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364 (2)(b) (2000);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.480(4)(a) (2000); N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 2000); 23 PA.
CODE § 5303(a)(1) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1515 (Law. Co-op. 2000); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.008 (Vernon 2000).
25. These jurisdictions include: Alaska, Arizona. Colorado, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See ALASKA. STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(A)(2)
(2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (2000); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-911(5)(A) (2000); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (Michie 2000); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/602(a)(2) (West 2000); IND. CODE § 31-14-13-2 (2000); IOWA CODE § 598.41(3)(f)
(2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(B) (Banks-
Baldwin 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653 (West 2000); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.23(3)(i) (2000); MNN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375 (2000);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(B) (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2000); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(i) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106 (2000); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-124.3 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(vi) (2000); Wis. STAT. § 767.24
(2000).
26. These states include: Florida, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Utah. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(i) (2000); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (West
1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (VI) (2000); OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(B)(1)
(West 2000); OKLA. STAT. Tit. 43, § 113 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45 (Michie
2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(1) (2000).
27. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(i) (2000).
28. These states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Vermont, and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-152
(2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (2000);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (2000); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2000); OR. REv.
STAT. § 107.137 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2000); VA. CODE § 48-10-4 (2000); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2000).
29. See discussion infra Part III.
[Vol. 25:815
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A. Mandatory Statutes Granting Controlling Weight to Child's Preference
The most progressive preference statutes are those granting controlling
weight to the children's preference. 30 These statutes require the courts to
solicit a child's preference before making a custody determination. 31 Further,
these statutes require that the child's preference control the court's deci-
sion.32 Twelve states currently grant controlling weight to a child's prefer-
ence in custody determinations. The most liberal of these, Pennsylvania,
with no additional conditions, requires the court to consider the preference
of the child in making an order for custody or partial custody.34 Similarly,
the majority of the other states in this category mandate the courts' consid-
eration of the child's preference subject to the additional condition of the
child's ability to reason intelligently. Some courts interpret the child's
ability to reason intelligently, strictly as an age restriction. Others evaluate
the individual child's reasoning ability. Still others evaluate the reasonable-
ness of the individual child's expressed wishes.
In Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Texas, the child's
preference is a controlling factor if that child has reached a specified age. 6
For example, the Mississippi Code states:
Provided, however, that if the court shall find that both parties are fit
and proper persons to have custody of the children, and that either
30. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 446.
31. Id. at 445 n.68.
32. Id. at 446.
33. See supra note 24.
34. 23 PA. CODE § 5303(a)(1) (2000). "In making an order for custody or partial
custody, the court shall consider the preference of the child as well as any other factor which
legitimately impacts the child's physical, intellectual and emotional well-being." Id.
35. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042 (a) (West 2000). "If a child is of sufficient age and
capacity to reason as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the court shall consider
and give due weight to the wishes of the child in making an order granting or modifying
custody." Id. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000) ("giving consideration to the
wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent prefer-
ence."); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-46(3) (2000). "If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to
reason, so as to form an intelligent preference, the child's wishes as to custody shall be
considered and be given due weight by the court." Id. See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364 (2)
(2000). "Mhe court shall consider... (b) [t]he desires and wishes of the minor child if of an
age of comprehension regardless of chronological age." Id. See also NEV. REy. STAT. §
125.480(4) (2000). "The court shall consider... (a) [t]he wishes of the child if the child is of
sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his custody." Id.
36. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(a)(3) (2000); MD. CODE ANN. § 9-103 (2000); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (2000); N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 2000); Tax. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.008 (West 2000).
2001]
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party is able to adequately provide for the care and maintenance of
the children, and that it would be to the best interest and welfare of
the children, then any such child who shall have reached his twelfth
birthday shall have the privilege of choosing the parent with whom
he shall live.
37
Similarly, the Georgia code provides that at the age of fourteen, the
child has the right to select with whom he or she desires to live. 38 Georgia
code mandates that the child's selection is always controlling unless the
parent selected is deemed not fit to have custody.39 In New Mexico, the
court must consider the desires of a minor who is fourteen years of age or
older.4° In Texas, a child of ten years of age or older has the right to choose• • 41
his/her guardian subject to court approval. In Maryland, a child who is
sixteen years or older has the right to file a petition to change custody. 2
The remaining five states in this category look to the child's maturity
and reasoning ability rather than age in deciding whether or not to give,p - 43
weight to the child's preference. In California, Connecticut, Hawaii, and
Nevada, if the child is shown to have the capacity to form an intelligent
preference as to where to live, the court must consider the child's wishes.4
In Nebraska, the final state in this category, the child's wishes must only
appear to be reasonable to require the court's granting weight.45
37. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (2000) (emphasis added).
38. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(a)(3) (2000). "In all cases in which the child has
reached the age of fourteen years, the child shall have the right to select the parent with whom
he or she desires to live." (emphasis added) Id.
39. Id.
40. N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 2000). "If the minor is fourteen years of age or
older, the court shall consider the desires of the minor as to with whom he wishes to live
before awarding custody of such minor." (emphasis added) Id.
41. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.008 (Vernon 2000). "If the child is twelve years of
age or older, the child may, by writing filed with the court, choose the managing conservator,
subject to the approval of the court." (emphasis added) Id. Texas reduced the age from
twelve years to ten years of age in the 2000 legislative session.
42. MD. CODE ANN. § 9-103 (2000). "A child who is sixteen years old... may file a
petition to change custody." (emphasis added) Id.
43. These states include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada. See
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(a) (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000); HAW. REv.
STAT. § 571-46(3) (2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364(2)(b) (2000); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125.480(4) (2000).
44. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042 (a) (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(3) (1999); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.480(4) (2000).
45. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364(2) (2000). "The court shall consider .... The desires
and wishes of the minor child if of an age of comprehension regardless of chronological age,
when such desires and wishes are based on sound reasoning." Id.
[Vol. 25:815
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B. Statutes Mandating Consideration
The second most progressive preference statutes mandate that the courts
consider the child's preference in custody determinations. 46 Although these
statutes require that the court hear the child's preference, the judge retains
nearly complete discretion as to its interpretation and utilization in the
custody determination. 7 Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
require their courts to consider the child's preference as one of several
factors in a custody determination.4 Among these twenty-two jurisdictions,
ten require their courts to consider the wishes of the child as to his or her
custodian irrespective of other characteristics of the child such as age,
maturity or intelligence. 9
Two of the remaining twelve states, Tennessee and Indiana, take the
child's age into account in determining the weight to be accorded to the
child's preference.50 In Indiana, the court is required to consider the wishes
of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child
is at least fourteen years of age.5 In Tennessee, the court is required to
consider the preference of any child twelve years of age or older; while still
acknowledgin that the court may consider the preference of younger chil-dren as well. z
The remaining ten states in this category require courts to consider the
preference of the child when the child is of sufficient age and capacity to
form an intelligent decision.53 Recognizing that children mature at different
46. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 452.
47. Id. at 454.
48. See supra note 25.
49. These jurisdictions include: Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Wisconsin. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 25-
403(A)(2) (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(5)(A)
(1999); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (2000); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(2) (West 2000); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (2000); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(B) (2000); Mo. R v. STAT.
§ 452.375 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(B) (2000); Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (2000).
50. See IND. CODE § 31-14-13-2(2), (3) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106 (2000).
51. IND. CODE § 31-14-13-2(2), (3). "In determining the child's best interests...
[t]he court shall consider ... (3) [t]he wishes of the child, with more consideration given to
the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age." (emphasis added) Id.
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106. "The court shall consider... (7) [t]he reasonable
preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older. The court may hear the preference
of a younger child upon request." (emphasis added) Id.
53. These states include: Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Virginia, and Washington. See ALASKA. STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie
2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (2000); IOWA CODE §598.41(3)(f) (2000); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit.19-A, § 1653 (West 2000); MICH. COM. LAws § 722.23(3)(i) (2000); MiNN.
2001]
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ages, these states give the courts the discretion to evaluate the child's matur-
ity and ability to intelligently state a preference.
5 4
C. Purely Discretionary Statutes
Unlike the mandatory language discussed for the previous two catego-
ries, several states use purely discretionary language in their preference
statutes.55 These statutes suggest but do not require courts look to the child
for a preference. 6 Seven states give the court discretion as to whether or not
to consider a child's preference in a custody determination. 7 The wording
of these statutes use language such as "the court may consider" as exempli-
fied in the South Dakota code:
In awarding the custody of a child the court shall be guided by con-
sideration of what appears to be for the best interest of the child in
respect to the child's temporal and mental and moral welfare. If
the child is of a sufficient age to form an intelligent preference, the
court may consider that preference in determining the question.
58
The trend in jurisdictions with purely discretionary statutes is for courts
to give the child's preference due consideration.5 9 For example, in Nazworth
v. Nazworth6° an Oklahoma appellate court held that a thirteen year old boy's
request to live with his father was recuired to be considered in determining
whether to change the boy's custody. 1 In Connelly v. Connelly a Louisi-
ana appellate court held that the child's preference is an appropriate factor to
STAT. § 518.17 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-
06.2(1)(i) (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 26.09.187(3)(vi) (2000):
54. Id.
55. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 457.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 26.
58. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-4-45 (Michie 2000).
59. See Nazworth v. Nazworth, 931 P.2d 86, 88 (Okla. 4th Div. Ct. App. 1996); see
also Connelly v. Connelly, 644 So. 2d 789 (La. 1st Cir. Ct. App. 1994); Hutchison v. Hutchi-
son, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982).
60. 931 P.2d 86, 88 (Okla. 4th Div. Ct. App. 1996).
61. Id. at 88. The court opinioned that "where the preference is explained by the
child and good reasons for the preference are disclosed, the preference and supporting reasons
will justify a change of custody." Id. (citing Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Wyo.
1985)).
62. 644 So. 2d 789, 789 (La. 1st Cir. Ct. App. 1994).
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consider in determining custody of the child.63 Similarly, in Hutchison v.
Hutchinson " the Supreme Court of Utah held that in making a custody
determination, the trial court may consider the preference of the child as one
of the factors.65 These courts all appear to be saying "listen to the children,
it's their lives that will be most affected."
D. No Statutory Reference
The remaining ten states make no mention in their statutes of a child's
preference in custody determinations.6 However, even with no statutory
guidelines, many of these states' courts give due consideration to the child's
67 68preference. For example, in Kenney v. Hickey, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island held that although the expressed preference of a minor child is
not conclusive, such preference is competent and highly probative evi-
dence.69  Similarly, in Wilcox-Elliott v. Wilcox, 7° the Supreme Court of
Wyoming held that a child's unequivocal preference to live with a'particular
71 7parent must be considered. . In Hinkle v. Hinkle, 2 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina gave considerable weight to the wishes of a child of suffi-
cient age to exercise discretion in choosing a custodian.73 The child reaches
the age of discretion when he or she "is of an age and capacity to form an
intelligent or rational view on the matter."74 Further, in Bak v. Bak,75 a
63. Id. at 795. The appellate court opinioned that great deference must be given to
the trier of fact's findings; and therefor found no error in the lower court's findings that the
child's testimony concerning his desire to remain with his mother was not credible. Il at 796.
64. 649 P.2d 38, 38 (Utah 1994).
65. Id. at 41.
66. See discussion supra note 28.
67. See Kenney v. Hickey, 486 A.2d 1079, 1083 (R.I. 1985) (noting that "it has been
our policy to afford a child's preference considerable weight"); see also Wilcox-Elliott v.
Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419, 421 (Wyo. 1996) (noting that "[a] child's unequivocal preference to
live with a particular parent is a factor which must be considered"); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 146
S.E.2d 73, 79 (N.C. 1966) (noting that "[t]he wishes of a child of sufficient age to exercise
discretion in choosing a custodian is entitled to considerable weight"); Bak v. Bak, 511
N.E.2d 625, 631 (Mass. App Ct. 1987) (noting that the preference of a child is a factor to be
considered).
68. 486 A.2d at 1079 (R.I. 1985).
69. id. at 1084. The court also opinioned that "the weight to be given to the prefer-
ence of the child is a matter within the sound discretion of the court." Id.
70. 924 P. 2d 419 (Wyo. 1996).
71. Id. at 421.
72. 146 S.E.2d 73 (N.C. 1966).
73. Id. at 79. The court opinioned that when the contest is between the parents, the
child's preference is not controlling. Id.
74. Id.
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Massachusetts appellate court held that the preference of a child is a factor
. . .. . 76
to be considered in making child custody determinations. These holdings
exemplify the proposition that absent express legislation, the lawmakers of
this nation still believe in the importance of consideration of a child's pref-
erence in custody decisions.
HII. FLORIDA LEGISLATION
Florida's custody statute gives the court sole discretion on whether or
not to consider a child's preference in making a custody determination.f
Section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes provides guidelines for custody and
support of children, visitation rights, and the power of the court in making
related orders.78 Specifically, section three provides "[flor purposes of
shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best interests of the
child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and
interests.,79 Although the statute does suggest factors that may affect the
child's welfare and interests,s° subsection three leaves the consideration of
any and all of the factors completely to the discretion of the court.8' This
discretion includes the child's preference factor.
8 2
In contrast to Florida's custody statute, a number of other Florida
statutes do mandate the consideration of the child's preference when deter-
83
mining the child's best interests. The subjects of these statutes range from
84 .85grandparental visitation rights to child-in-need of service cases to termi-
75. 511 N.E.2d 625 (Mass. App Ct. 1987).
76. Id. at 631. The appellate court also gave consideration to the report of one of the
family's service officers as to the child's wishes. Id.
77. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2000).
78. Id.
79. § 61.13(3).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. "The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference." § 61.13(3)(i).
83. See FLA. STAT. § 752.01(2) (2000). "In determining the best interest of the minor
child, the court shall consider ... (c) [tlhe preference of the child if the child if the child is
determined to be of sufficient maturity to express a preference." Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §
984.20(3)(a)(9) (2000) (stating "[tihe predisposition study shall cover... (9) [t]he reasonable
preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understand-
ing, and experience to express a preference"); FLA. STAT. § 39.810 (2000) (stating "[iln a
hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights, the court shall consider... (10) [tlhe
reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient
intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference")
84. § 752.01.
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nation of parental rights.86 For example, in a petition for termination of
parental rights, the court is required to consider the reasonable preference
and wishes of the child, if the court determines that the child is capable of
expressing such a preference. 87 Similarly, in actions for grandparent visita-
tion, the court is required to consider the preference of the child if the child
is mature enough to express a preference. 8  In disposition hearings to
determine custody of a child in need of service, 9 the court is required to
consider the reasonable preference of the child.90 These statutes, all cover-
ing topics relating to the child's residence and visitation, represent a legisla-
tive intent to listen to the preference of the children.
Recent bills introduced in both the Florida Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives further exemplify legislative intent to give weight to children's
wishes in various custody decisions. Examples include Florida Senate Bill
117691 and House Bill 447.92 These companion bills provided instruction for
judges in domestic violence cases.93 Specifically, these bills provided for the
prohibition of court awarded visitation rights to a parent who has been
convicted of a capital felony or a first-degree felony that involved domestic
violence.94 The bills provided that this prohibition on visitation could be
overridden by an agreement to the visitation by a child over sixteen years of
age.95 In other words, when the child stated a preference for visitation, this
preference controlled the court's decision. The numerous bills introduced
into the Florida Senate and House of Representatives historically every year
containing similar language, further demonstrate that many Florida legisla-
tors acknowledge the need to modify the Florida custody statute. It is just a
matter of time before the assertion of this article, that children's preferences
should be considered in Florida custody decisions, will be added to Florida's
custody statute.
85. § 984.20.
86. § 39.810.
87. Id.
88. § 752.01(2)(c).
89. § 984.20. The statute regulates the procedure for determining custody of a child
who has been removed from his or her residence and taken into custody of the court for
reasons such as domestic violence. Id.
90. Id.
91. S. 1176, 1999 Leg., 104th Sess. (Fla. 1999) (dying in committee on fiscal policy
for unrelated reasons).
92. H.R. 447, Leg., 101st Sess. (Fla. 1999) (dying in committee on criminal justice
appropriations for unrelated reasons).
93. S. 1176 at 1; H.R. 447 at 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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IV. FLORIDA COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
A. Supreme Court of Florida
The highest court in Florida is the Supreme Court.96 The Supreme
Court of Florida has the power to determine the interpretation of the state's
legislation for uniformity within the state's lower courts.97 At its discretion,
the Supreme Court of Florida reviews decisions of lower courts that ex-
pressly validate a state statute, construe a provision of the state or federal
constitution, affect a class of constitutional or state officers, or directly
conflict with a decision of another Florida court on the same question of
law.98 The Supreme Court of Florida also reviews certain categories of
judgments, decisions, and questions of law certified to it by the district
courts of appeal and federal appellate courts. The Supreme Court of Florida
has the constitutional authority to issue a number of writs including an
extraordinary writ.
99
The Supreme Court of Florida led the nation in giving children the
opportunity to express their custodial preferences.'0 ° In 1887, in the un-
precedented case of Williams v. Williams,'0' the Supreme Court of Florida
allowed three girls to remain with their father when they had all expressed a
preference to do so, the father was able to give them a comfortable home and
support, while the mother had no other means but alimony for support.'0 2 A
few years later, in Marshall v. Reams, 1 3 the court established what was later
to become a national standard for giving a child the right to express his/her
preference when the child has reached the age of intelligent discretion.'0 In
Marshall, the child, Edward Reams, was over sixteen years old and desired
to remain in the care of his uncle, F.F. Marshall, where he had resided since
96. FLA.'S COURT SYSTEM, at http://www.flcourts.org/courts/supct/system2.html (last
visited Aug. 11, 1999).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. "An extraordinary writ is an order commanding a person or entity to perform or to
refrain from performing a particular act. They are by nature extraordinary and for that reason
are not available as an alternative to the usual trial and appeal. Both by their historical
development and by current judicial decisions, the writs are made available only in a narrow
class of exceptional cases." Id.
100. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 442.
101. 2 So. 768 (Fla. 1887).
102. Id. at 773. The evidence in this case included letters from the teenage daughters
expressing strong preference to living with the father. Id. at 770.
103. 14 So. 95 (Fla. 1893).
104. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 443.
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his mother's death. 0 5 Henry6Reams, Edward's father petitioned for custody
of his out of wedlock son. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the
lower court decision and allowed Edward to remain with his uncle. 07 The
court in its precedent setting opinion held: "[wihere the child has reached
the age of discretion it will often be allowed to make its own choice, al-
though the person chosen is not one whom the court would voluntarily
appoint.'
0 8
Thereafter, throughout the next century, the Supreme Court of Florida
continued to advocate the consideration of children's preference in custody
cases.'0 9 Even when the preferences of the minor children were split, the
court is willing to split up the children to meet these preferences.-'1 For
example, in Epperson v. Epperson,"' the three sons aged sixteen, twelve,
and eight expressed a preference to live with their father, whereas the eight-
een year old daughter wanted to remain with the mother.1 2 The court de-
clared that when boys of sixteen and twelve years of age express a decided
preference to remain with one parent, this preference should be accorded due
weight and allowed the sons to reside with the father and the daughter to
reside with the mother.'
The Supreme Court of Florida also recognized the psychological affect
of a refusal to consider a child's preference." 4  For example, in Eddy v.
Staufer"5 the court held that a fifteen year old -boy is at an age where he
should have the ability to exercise reasonable discretion.' 6  The court
opined: "[i]ndeed, the course of his life may be affected adversely by a
105. Marshall, 14 So. at 95.
106. 1&.
107. Id. at 97.
108. Id. at 96 (quoting CHURCH, HABEus CoRPus § 447).
109. See Eddy v. Staufer, 37 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1948) (holding that the desires of a
fifteen year old boy should be given great weight); see also Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So. 2d
367 (Fla. 1958). The Epperson court held that when "normal and intelligent boys of the ages
of 16 and 12 express a decided preference for the companionship of one parent over the other,
we think their preference should be accorded due weight in settling the matter of custody." Id.
at 370. See also Gregory v. Gregory, 313 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1975). The court affirmed the trial
judge's conclusion that "(wie always listen to children of that age expressing views." Id. at
738.
110. See Epperson, 101 So. 2d at 368.
111. 101 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1958).
112. Id. at369.
113. Id. at 370. The court noted that "[tihe preference of the children is not absolutely
controlling but it should be given considerable weight as between parents of relatively equal
fitness." Id.
114. See Eddy, 37 So. 2d at 418.
115. 37 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1948).
116. Id. at418.
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refusal of the Florida courts to consider his unquestioned preference."' 17
Continuing along those lines, in Gregory v. Gregory,118 the Supreme Court
of Florida disagreed with the district court's statement that the courts are not
bound by a child's views because children sometimes don't know what is
best for themselves. 19 In its opinion, the court pointed to the quality of the
relationship between the father and son in this case for deciding what is the
best for the son. 2°
Despite the historical expression supportive of children's preference
over the first two-thirds of the past century, the Supreme Court of Florida
has been silent on the subject in the past two decades, choosing to leave such
decisions to the lower district courts of appeals.12 1 This silence has had the
detrimental affect of creating chaos in Florida's court system. With no
strong direction from the highest court in the state, a diverse spectrum of
interpretation of the law by the district courts has resulted.
22
B. Florida's District Courts of Appeal: Divided Interpretations
In general, the Supreme Court of Florida does not hear the bulk of trial
court decisions in Florida that are appealed. 123 Instead, they are reviewed by
the District Courts of Appeal.124 Prior to 1957, when the District Courts of
Appeals were established in Florida, all appeals were heard solely by the
Supreme Court of Florida. 25 The Florida Constitution now provides that the
Legislature divide the State into appellate court districts with a District
Court of Appeal serving each district.'2 Currently, there are five such
117. Id.
118. 313So.2dat735.
119. Id. at 738. The son candidly expressed his preference to be with his father and
stated that if he would rather go to ajuvenile home then live with his mother. Id.
120. Id. The court held that:
The pole star of the cases before us is based upon the simplest element of
all-the united relationship of the father and son and the quality it possesses
in this instance for the bet welfare of the son. Unfortunately, good parental
association has no single word in our language, however, sub judice the fa-
ther and son have achieved it.
Id.
121. Research for this article failed to discover any Supreme Court of Florida opinions,
in the past decade, expressing a stance with regard to child preference in custody decisions.
122. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.I., 5.
123. FLA.'s COURT SYSTEM, supra note 96.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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districts headquartered in Tallahassee, Lakeland, Miami, West Palm Beach,
and Daytona Beach.127
The jurisdiction of the District Courts of Appeal extends to appeals
from final judgments and orders of trial courts either not directly appealable
to the Supreme Court of Florida or not taken from a county court to a circuit
court, and to the review of certain non-final orders.1
2
The District Courts of Appeals have also been granted constitutional
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, manda-
mus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, as well as all other writs necessary to
the complete exercise of their jurisdiction. 29
As a general rule, decisions of the District Courts of Appeal represent
the final appellate review of litigated cases. 30 A person who is displeased
with a district court's express decision may ask for review in the Supreme
Court of Florida or in the United States Supreme Court, but neither tribunal
is required to accept the case for further review; the overwhelming number
of requests are in fact denied.1
3
'
In past history, all five of the district courts gave credence to a child's
preference in child custody modification proceedings. 32  Further, they
tended to uphold lower courts rulings.133 Over the past two decades, how-
ever, the courts have divided. Some Districts Courts reversing modifications
granted by the lower courts and surprisingly giving little weight to the
expressed preferences of the children involved, others giving some consid-
eration, while still others remaining dedicated to listening to the preferences
of the children. 134
127. Id.
128. FLA.'s COuRT SYSTEm, supra note 96.
129. Id.
130. d
131. Id.
132. See Martin v. Martin, 215 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (allowing
the children to remain with their father based on their admitted preference to do so); see also
Udell v. Udell, 151 So. 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that ajudge should
give weight to the expressed desires of a child); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d 49, 52
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the expressed desire of a child is entitled to
weight).
133. See Burley v. Burley, 438 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that a minor child's preference shall be given "such weight as the trial court deter-
mines appropriate"); see also Udell, 151 So. 2d at 864 (noting that the trial judge is in a more
advantageous position than an appellate court to determine the problems in each divorce case).
134. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.I., 5.
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1. First District Court of Appeal of Florida: No Weight Given
The First District Court of Appeal of Florida gives very little weight to
the expressed preferences of children in child custody cases. 135 Further, in
custody modification cases, this court advocates leaving the children wher-
ever the original decree had placed custody. 6 The First District requires the
non-custodial parent, who seeks modification of an earlier custody award, to
first prove a substantial change of circumstances and secondly prove that the
welfare of the child would be promoted by the changed custody.
137
The First District requires that the non-custodial parent seeking to
modify a prior award of custody carry an extraordinary burden.38 In Holmes
v. Green139 both children'40 expressed a strong desire to have their primary
residence changed; 14' and the trial court had found that the welfare of the
children would best be served by the transfer of their primary residence to
their father.' 42 However, the First District Court of Appeal held that the
evidence presented was insufficient 143 and the trial court abused its discre-
tion when it changed the primary residence of the two girls. 14
135. See Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So. 2d 1034, 1036 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that even if the children had all "evinced a clear and definite desire to live with their
father and not with their mother, that preference would not alone be dispositive of the issue
whether their best interests would be served by ordering a change in custody"); see also
Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 726 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that allowing
minor children to pick and choose the parent with whom they will reside is not in the best
interest of the child.); see also Holmes v. Green, 649 So. 2d 302, 305 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (citing Elkins v. Vander, 433 So. 2d 125 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) which held
"[the law does not give children the unfettered discretion to choose the parent with whom
they will live")).
136. See Zediker, 444 So. 2d at 1038 (noting that the appellate court's task is only to
determine whether the trial judge's discretion is supported in the record).
137. Id. (quoting Steams v. Szikney, 386 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980)).
138. Id. at 1036 (quoting McGregor v. McGregor, 418 So. 2d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
139. 649 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
140. The children were twelve year old twin daughters. Id. at 303.
141. Id. at 304.
142. Id.
143. The evidence presented demonstrated domestic violence and marital disharmony
in the mother's home and that the mother worked odd hours and weekends. Id at 303.
144. Holmes, 649 So. 2d at 304. "The evidence is insufficient to sustain the trial
court's order changing the primary residence of the parties' children. Accordingly, that order
is reversed." Id. at 305.
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The First District-lacks confidence in children's ability to make deci-
sions about their residence. 45 Although the court declared that if the child
possesses sufficient maturity and understanding to make an intelligent
choice, it will be considered, it did not accept that two twelve year old girls
have this intelligence level. 14 In Holmes, the court opinioned that even if
the child is shown to possess the necessary traits to make the decision, this
preference alone is not sufficient to sustain a change in primary residence.' 47
The case of Brown v. Brown'48 exemplifies the First District's lack of
confidence in children's decision making ability. In Brown, the final judg-
ment dissolving the marriage of the parties gave custody of the children to
the mother; but included a clause allowing the children to live with their
father if they chose without further order of the court. 49 The First District
found this clause to be in error, holding that allowing minor children to pick
which parent they live with is not in the best interests of the children.150
One case anomaly in the First District, upheld a change of custody. In
Martin v. Martin,'51 the First District held that the two-part test had been
satisfied. 152 In Martin, the father requested a permanent change in custody
based on the children' expressed preference to remain with the father and
evidence of the poor condition of their mother's home.
54
Notwithstanding the Martin opinion, the general opinion of the First
District is summarized in this quotation from Holmes v. Green:
The law does not give children the unfettered discretion to choose
the parent with whom they will live.... or gratify the wishes of
children at the expense of the rights of a parent.... Were it other-
wise, the law would encourage manipulation by both children and
145. See Brown, 300 So. 2d at 726. "Allowing minor children to pick and choose at
their will the parent with whom they will reside only invites then to 'play one parent against
the other."' Icl
146. Holmes, 649 So. 2d at 305.
147. Id. at 305.
148. 300 So. 2d at 719.
149. 1L at 720. The final judgment dissolving the marriage included the statement
"[t]he wife shall have custody of the children of the parties... with the court allow-
ing ... [the children] to live with their father if this is their desire, without further order of this
Court." Id.
150. Id. at 726.
151. 215 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
152. 1l at 82.
153. The children were eleven and thirteen years of age. Id. at 81.
154. The mother lived in Italy and had written the father requesting he take the children
because of the poor conditions in her home. Id.
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parents and foster a breakdown in discipline, neither of which is in
the best interests of the children.' 
55
2. Second District Court of Appeal of Florida: Change of Viewpoint
Over the years, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal changed its
position on the weight given to a child's preference in custody proceedings.
Historically, the Second District gave deference to the child's preference in
custody determinations. 156 In the past decade, however, the Second District
has required the extraordinary burden test to be satisfied before upholding a
modification to a child custody decree.1
57
In~~~ ~  194 na l158
In 1974. in an opinion combining the cases of Taylor v. Schlt 8 and
Gregory v. Gregory, the Second District considered the weight to be given
to children's preferences in custody litigation.16  In Taylor, the second
district held that children old enough to have a well considered judgment,
who unanimously want to live with their mother, in whose home they find
love and good care, should be placed with their mother.1 61 Both parents in
Taylor were found to be fit parents, and the children aged eleven to fifteen
years old testified that their mother's home was full of love and the father's
full of fear. 62 Based upon the children's preferences and testimony, the
court allowed the change of custody, recognizing that the course of a child's
life might be adversely affected by the court's refusal to consider his/her
155. Holmes, 649 So. 2d at 305 (quoting Elkins v. Vanden Bosch, 433 So. 2d 1251,
1253 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
156. See Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (noting that
"children old enough to have well considered judgment, who unanimously want to live with
their mother, in whose home they find love and good care, should be placed with their
mother"); see also Udell v. Udell, 151 So. 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (noting
that a "judge should and does give weight to the expressed desires of a child to be in the
custody of a particular parent").
157. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (two
consistent requirements to explain the extraordinary burden test).
First, the party seeking to modify a custody decree must plead and es-
tablish that circumstances have substantially changed since the final
judgment.... Second, the petitioner must establish that the change has
such an important impact on the child that the court is justified in im-
posing a change of custody in the 'best interest' of the child.
Id. at 641.
158. 292 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
159. 313 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1975).
160. 292 So. 2d at 48.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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preference. 163  Similarly, in Udell, the court upheld a thirteen-year-old
child's preference to remain with her father.'6 In Udell, both the father and
mother were found to be proper custodians of the child.165 Thus, preference
of the child became the deciding factor.
166
In Eades v. Dorio,167 a case deciding custody between a father and the
maternal grandparents, the Second District allowed the children to remain
with the grandparents based on the expressed preferences of the children.
168
Although the appellate court admitted that the rights of parents would not be
disregarded to meet the wishes of a child, it further held that the court of
appeals cannot overturn a decision by a chancellor who had the opportunity
to observe the parties and witnesses and other intangibles.
1 69
In the past decade, however, the Second District Court of Appeal
completely reversed its position, and has typically overturned modifications
of child custody granted by lower courts.' The Second District's interpre-
tation of the two-part extraordinary burden test outlined in Gibbs v. Gibbs'7'
created a new requirement that there be some significant inadequacy of care
provided by the custodial parent before a modification of custody would be
considered.17 2  The difficulty in proving significant inadequacy of care
provided by the custodial parent has led to a consistent overturning of modi-
fication decrees. The Second District Court of Appeal justified it's deaf ear
towards the child's wishes in Chant by stating that courts should not micro-
manage a child's custody. 73 In contrast to this excuse made in Chant, in
163. kI. at 50.
164. 151 So. 2d 863, 865 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
165. Id. at 864.
166. Id The appellate court opinioned that the testimony before the court could have
shown that it was better for the minor daughter to remain in the custody of either parent and
therefor the lower court's discretion would not be disturbed. Id.
167. 113 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
168. Id at 234. The children were eleven and thirteen, expressed a desire to live with
the maternal grandparents and no desire to remain with the natural father. Id.
169. Id
170. See Chant v. Chant, 725 So. 2d 445, 448 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing
lower court's ruling with directions to reinstate the mother as the children's primary residen-
tial parent); see also Gibbs, 686 So. 2d at 645 ("reversing and remanding for entry of an order
reinstating the mother as custodial parent").
171. See Gibbs, 686 So. 2d at 639.
172. See Chant, 725 So. 2d at 447 (quoting Gibbs, 686 So. 2d at 641. "This test
involves more than a decision that the petitioning parent's home would be 'better' for the
child, and requires a determination that there is some significant inadequacy in the care
provided by the custodial parent.").
173. Chant, 725 So. 2d at 448. "[IThe best interests test is not intended to allow the
court to micromanage a child's custody from the entry of the final judgment until the child
becomes an adult." Id.
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Heatherington v. Heatherington,'74 the court did micromanage the child's
custody by not allowing the child's preference to be adhered to even when
the child threatened to run away if made to live with the other parent.
75
Observe how the court changes its reasoning based on the overriding desire
not to listen to children's preferences. This "new" Second District Court of
Appeals apparently does not see the adverse impact it's decision not to
consider a child's preference has on that child's life.
3. Third District Court of Appeal of Florida: Confusion
Until the mid-1970s, the Third District Court of Appeal gave control-
ling weight to a child's preference in child custody proceedings. During
that time period, the Third District consistently held the belief that the
custody of a minor child is a proper subject for judicial consideration at any
time by the court that granted the divorce decree. 177 In Goldstein v. Gold-
stein,' the court stated that a child's preference was entitled to great weight
in cases where the child is mature enough to make a reasonable choice. 7
Although both parents were found to be fit in Goldstein, the child's prefer-
ence and statements that he would leave home if his wishes were not adhered
to was found to be detrimental enough to accord the modification of cus-
tody.1
80
In Pollak v. Pollak,"' the Third District Court of Appeal upheld a
chancellor's determination of custody in accordance with each of the chil-
dren's expressed individual preferences even though it meant splitting up the
children. r82 Likewise, in Borden v. Borden, 1 3 the fifteen year old son pre-
174. 677 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
175. Id. at 1314. The child commented that she might run away if forced to live with
her father and the trial judge was concerned with this comment. Id. at 1313. The appellate
court disregarded the trial judge's discretion and reversed. Id. at 1314.
176. See Goldstein v. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that the desire of a mature child is entitled to weight); see also Pollak v. Pollak, 196
So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that children's preferences are to be
given some weight); Borden v. Borden, 193 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(holding that the desires of a fifteen year old should be given great weight).
177. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d at 51 (quoting Frazier v. Frazier, 147 So. 464 (Fla.1933)).
178. 264 So. 2d 49 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App 1972).
179. Id. at 52.
180. Id. The child, Herbert Goldstein, was fourteen years of age and the trial court had
found that there was a likelihood that the boy would leave home if required to remain with his
mother. Id.
181. 196 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
182. Id. at 772. In this case two of the sons preferred to be with their father, one son
had no preference, and the daughter preferred to remain with their mother. Id. The court
836 [Vol. 25:815
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ferred to live with the father, whereas the twelve year old daughter preferred
not to make a choice. 1 4 The Borden court held that the son's preference was
sufficient to grant custody of both children to the father.'85
In 1975, a major departure in the consistent Third District Court of
Appeal's opinions occurred. From that time forward, this court's diverse
handling of children's preferences in custody proceedings has created major
confusion in the district. The cause of this diversity appears to be the inter-
pretation of the Third District's requirement that the parent seeking to
reverse a custody order modification must establish its unreasonableness or
an abuse of discretion. 186 In one interpretation, Gaber v. Gaber,187 a child's
preference was the key factor in modification of custody by the trial court.
188
The Third District Court reversed the trial court's decision stating that "the
child's wish is merely a factor to be considered... [but] not a dispositive
factor."' Similarly, in Kitchens v. Kitchens,' the court stated that it is not
required to consider a child's preference in modification of custody proceed-
ings. 9, Most recently, in Perez v. Perez,192 the court held that the stated
preference of a fifteen and eleven year old child without more, was insuffi-
cient to sustain a change in primary residence. In contrast, in Walfish v.
Walfish,94 the Third District stated that the trial court, in making a determi-
nation of custody, may properly consider the wishes of the child. 95 In still
another interpretation, Berlin v. Berlin,'96 the court held that consideration of
children's preferences was limited to those of a child mature enough to make
a reasonable choice.
197
disregarded a policy proposed by the mother that the children all be awarded to one parent in
favor of adhering to the children's individual preferences. Id.
183. 193 So. 2d 15, 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
184. d at 16.
185. Id
186. ld.
187. 536 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
188. Id. at 382.
189. Id. The dissent in this case argues that the trial court's decision should be upheld
based on principles set forth in Goldstein, Epperson, and Purdon. Id.
190. 305 So. 2d 249(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
191. Il at250.
192. 767 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
193. Id. at519.
194. 383 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
195. Il at n.1. Note the contrast in the fourteen year old Gaber child's preferences not
being accorded consideration and the eight and ten year old Walfish children's preferences
being accorded consideration.
196. 386 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
197. Id. at 579.
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Factual similarities do not necessarily lead to similar opinions in the
Third District Court of Appeal. For example, the court in Walfish held that
despite the child's preference to live with their father and the findings that
the father was a fit parent, the failure to show that the mother was unfit
prohibited the modification granted by the lower court.198 In a similar
factual case, Elkins v. Vanden Bosch'9 the court held that the stated prefer-
ence of children to be in the custody of the father is not a material change of
circumstance that will support a custody change.2 The inconsistency or
vacillation of this court over similar facts and circumstances tends to give
the impression of indecision over the subject matter.
4. Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida: Quiet Consideration
In the handful of cases heard on the subject, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal has considered the child's preference as one of a number of equally
considered factors in a custody determination. 20 ' For example, in Burley v.
Burley the Fourth District held that a change in preference by a minor child
may be considered and "given such weight as the trial court determines
202appropriate." The Fourth District supports the belief that the parent
seeking a change in custody shoulders a heavy burden.20 3 Further, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal gives general deference to the trial court's
decisions in such cases.2W Preference by one or more minor children as to
which parent shall have custody is given as much weight as the trial court
determines appropriate. 205 In Brown v. Brown,2 6 the Fourth District Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination of custody based on themi-
nor children's wishes.2°7 The lower court in Brown had placed the fourteen
and sixteen year old children in the custody of their father based on the
children electing to live with their father.208 Although only a few cases have
been considered by the Fourth District in recent years, it's quiet avocation of
children's rights to be heard in custody decisions follows the national trend
admirably.
198. Walfish, 383 So. 2d at 276.
199. 433 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
200. Id. at 1252.
201. See Burley v. Burley, 438 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 409 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1035.
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5. Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida: The Advocate
The Fifth District Court of Appeal consistently advocates giving weight
to the preferences of children in custody determinations.209 In Greene v.
Kelly, the Fifth District Court of Appeal relied heavily on the national trend
rather than the Florida trend to give greater deference to the child's prefer-
ence and opinion.2 10 Further in Greene, the Fifth District opinioned that the
law recognizes a child's preference, if the child is of sufficient maturity, as a
factor in the determination of custody.21' This court equated a child now
being able to realistically make a preference when she could not do so at the
time of the original custody order as a change in circumstances sufficient to
make a custody modification.2 1 2 In Greene, the thirteen year old daughter
was awarded to the mother at the time of the dissolution of marriage, when
the daughter was less than four years old.2 3 Ten years later, she requested a
214
change in custody to live with her father. The Fifth District upheld the
modification based on the daughter's preference.215 In another case regard-
ing grandparent visitation, Ward v. Dibble,21 6 the children, aged fifteen and
sixteen, testified that they did not want to go on visitation with their grand-
217
mother. The court upheld the children's wishes and denied the visitation
with the grandmother. 2r8 The consistency of the Fifth District in upholding
the rights of children to be heard in Florida's custody decisions should serve
as a role model for the rest of the Florida court system.
V. JUDGES ARE NOT LISTENING
Although Florida statutes do not require a court to follow the expressed
wishes of a child in a custody case, they do suggest the judge consider the
- 219
child's preferences as one factor. In Florida, the weight that judges actu-
ally give to a child's preference varies greatly as illustrated in the previous
209. See, e.g., Greene v. Kelly, 712 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). "A
child's preference is a consideration even in the determination of whether a change of circum-
stances has occurred." Id at 1202.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Il
213. Greene, 712 So. 2d at 1202.
214. Id
215. Id. at 1203.
216. 683 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
217. Id. at 668.
218. Id at670.
219. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(i) (2000).
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discussion of Florida's courts.2 ° Judges typically base decisions on intuition
and a common understanding of social norms as opposed to any systematic
221use of child development theory and research to inform such decisions.
Studies of the attitudes of judges towards children's participation in
custody proceedings indicate that the child's preference was typically not
accorded significant weight.222 In fact, in one study 115 Indiana judges were
asked to rank factors important to custody decisions, children's preferences
regarding where they want to live was at the bottom of the list of factors.
223
However, in Virginia, one survey of judges found that there was a clear
correlation between the age of the child and the weight given her prefer-
ence. Nearly ninety percent of the judges surveyed indicated that the
preference of children aged fourteen and older was either dispositive or
extremely important; whereas that of children aged below ten were dis-
counted significantly.2 5
Indicative of judges' general disregard for the importance of listening to
children in custody determinations is the small amount of time the judges
typically spend with the children to evaluate their preferences. For example,
a study of twenty-six judges in Michigan found that judges spent an average
of only eighteen minutes with children who were the subject of custody
226battles. Another study indicated that fifteen minutes was the norm for
227judges in Colorado.
Critics suggest that the brief judicial interviews are an inadequate
means for ascertaining a child's real preference in a custody dispute. 2 One
major source of error is the judges' reluctance to ask direct questions of the
child for fear of causing pain to the child.229 Judges instead infer preference
from other questions asked of the child, leading to frequent error in the
judge's inference.2 0
Although not a complete solution, a statutory mandate to consider
children's preferences in custody determinations would at least remove a
major part of the disorder created by the combination of the inconsistency in
220. See discussion supra Part IV.
221. Mlyniac, supra note 10, at 1889.
222. Scott, supra note 11, at 1043 n.22.
223. Michael H. Hodges, Judges Agree on the Issues in Divorces, Study Says, DETorr
NEWS, June 17, 1996 at B1.
224. Scott, supra note 11, at 1050.
225. Id.
226. Mlyniac, supra note 10, at 1887.
227. Id. at n.86.
228. Scott, supra note 11, at 1055.
229. Id. at 1056.
230. Id.
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the Florida courts and the tendency of the judges not to correctly interpret
children's wishes.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
The broad grant of discretion given judges by Florida's custody statute
does not always result in providing for the best interests of the child. The
result includes indeterminate outcomes and difficult settlement negotia-
tions.231 Explicit statutory guidance is required. Statutory guidance would
enhance certainty and predictability in the decision making process. Statu-
tory guidance would further eliminate the likelihood of misunderstandilg
facts and circumstances and allowing biases to interfere with decisions:
Lending certainty to custody determinations through the use of an easily
applied rule leads to an outcome in line with the lefal objective: a custody
decision that reflects the best interests of the child.2
3
Florida legislators have taken the first step with statutes mandating
consideration of children's preference in other related issues. It's now time
to align Florida's custody statute with these other Florida statutes and with
the statutes and case law of the rest of the nation.
Understandably, it is expected that Florida judges will be opposed to
such statutory mandates. For example, a Virginia study revealed that al-
though in practice the judges were deferential towards the wishes of older
children, many judges were opposed to limits on judicial discretion."3 4 Such
opposition is outweighed by the benefit to Florida's growing population of
single-parent households.
VII. CONCLUSION
The parameters established by the United States Supreme Court's
jurisprudence demonstrate that the way to secure children's rights is to
empower them to exercise those-rights as soon as they are able to do so.235
The Supreme Court of Florida in 1887 initiated the national trend towards
listening to children's wishes in custody determinations. It is now time for
Florida to go back to its roots and re-institutionalize this policy; to follow the
guidelines of the United States Supreme Court, and empower the children of
Florida by statutorily mandating that they be seen and heard in Florida
custody determinations.
Randi L Dulaney
231. Kandel, supra note 8, at 338.
232. Id.
233. Scott, supra note 11, at 1063.
234. Id. at 1051.
235. Kandel, supra note 8, at 348.
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